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Agriculture and Food Biosecurity Planning Committee: Summary of Meeting
March 25-26, 2003, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis

Participants
Purpose of Meeting
Discussion of Biosecurity Needs
The Role of the University of Minnesota
Outcome
Next Steps
Appendix A: Agriculture and Food Biosecurity Planning Committee Members
Appendix B: University of Minnesota Project Staff and Consultants
Appendix C: Other Participants

Participants

Industry

The Agriculture and Food Biosecurity Planning Committee, organized by the University of Minnesota in collaboration with industry members, is a farm-to-table group of senior executives and senior scientific leaders in the industry. Areas of expertise among the members include food safety, quality assurance, regulatory affairs, animal health, and security. The group's composition reflects a balance of interests across the entire food chainfarm inputs, livestock production, crop production, manufacturing and processing of commodities and consumer food products, wholesale food, retail, and food service. (See Appendix A for a list of Committee members.)

University of Minnesota Conveners

Three University of Minnesota groups collaboratively convened this meeting: the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP),* the Center for Animal Health and Food Safety, and the School of Public Health Division of Environmental and Occupational Health. (See Appendix B for a list of University participants.)

Other Participants

See Appendix C.

Purpose of the Meeting

The goal for this meeting was two-fold: to assess if industry needs a neutral, third party, science-based agriculture and food biosecurity resource center, and if so, to determine how to structure its development.

Discussion of Biosecurity Needs

The Committee examined a range of issues surrounding the potential value to the industry and to the public good of a national food system biosecurity resource center through a series of presentations and group discussions. To highlight specific issues concerning current levels of preparedness and response to biosecurity threats, the University participants presented three challenging but plausible scenarios of agricultural or food-related bioterrorism.

During and after the scenario discussions, the Committee focused on identifying unresolved issues leading to current critical gaps in food system biosecurity, ways to bridge those gaps, and the potential role of the University of Minnesota in this area. The following is a summary of this discussion.

Key unresolved issues

The Committee identified major unresolved issues affecting the ability of the food system to adequately prepare for and respond to biosecurity threats. Examples of these issues include:

• A large-scale outbreak of foodborne disease or livestock disease could overwhelm existing public and private response capabilities and resources.
• A significant part of food system biosecurity depends on the security and interdependence of related sectors (particularly transportation, water supplies, electrical power, and information technology).
• Biosecurity efforts need to be coordinated across all sectors of the food system (farm to fork, including animal and crop production, manufacturing and processing, wholesale, retail, and food service) and with public health and animal health sectors, both public and governmental.
• The flow of specific intelligence data (especially real time information) that is interpretable and actionable to the food system industry needs to be improved; more industry security clearances are needed to receive and assist in analysis of such data.
• Independent, unbiased expertise and scientific information is needed to assist the food system to identify biosecurity issues prospectively, prioritize threats, perform risk assessments, assess vulnerabilities, and manage crisis situations.
• Real engagement of the private sector is necessary to effectively address biosecurity issues in the food system.

Preliminary Results of the University of Minnesota's Needs Assessment Survey

To provide additional insight into current industry perspectives, the University participants summarized the results of a recently completed survey. Between November 2002 and January 2003, CIDRAP conducted a needs assessment survey of 25 senior officials in 14 major national and international companies and 11 trade associations across the food system. Using a key informant interview format, the survey addressed: 1) perceptions of risks to their industry and to the entire food system, 2) priorities regarding information sharing and analysis, and 3) needs for Internet-based information resources concerning food system biosecurity. CIDRAP staff designed the survey instrument in consultation with Sue Ferenc (SĀF?RISK, LC), project consultant. Observations based on a preliminary review of the data include the following:

• Industry members are very concerned about the potential use of biological agents, biological toxins, and chemical agents (and to a lesser extent, radiological and physical agents) as contaminants in food or agricultural products.
• High levels of concern are also evident for a variety of other possible threats to the industry, including interruption of water supplies, lack of control over the security of products during transportation, and the potentially damaging business consequences of hoax threats and inaccurate media reporting.
• Companies recognize a need to share biosecurity information, especially to discern patterns of suspicious events, but are reluctant to do so with trade associations, other companies, and government because of concerns over confidentiality, proprietary issues, the potential for company information to enter the public domain through freedom of information requests, and potential liabilities.

Features of an Agriculture and Food Biosecurity Rresource Center

The Committee considered a variety of possible services aimed at improving biosecurity preparedness across the food system. They developed a list of critical features of an agriculture and food biosecurity resource center, including:

• Surveillance and analysis: 1) collection and analysis of information from companies on atypical, suspicious events and unusual clusters or trends, to enable early recognition of threats or outbreaks, 2) implementation of an early alert network using real time information, 3) coordination with veterinary reporting requirements, ?intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and security organizations in other sectors, including transportation, water, and electric power, and 4) in the event of a foodborne outbreak or terrorist attack: provide all relevant information collected by the center to appropriate federal, state, and local government authorities on a timely basis and as determined by the protocol developed by the industry participants, and assist in the investigation and public health response as requested by the government authorities.
• Response: 1) facilitation of rapid diagnostic response (e.g., by maintaining a list of accredited food/agricultural labs), 2) guidance on responding to unusual outbreak and terrorism response events such as white powder contamination and exotic infectious agent concerns, 3) provision of 24/7 access to independent expertise, 4) convening expert groups for problem-solving, scenario planning, crisis management, triage protocols, and blue sky exercises, and 5) public communications, including provision of unbiased scientific information for company message development and serving as an independent scientific resource on agriculture and food biosecurity issues for industry.
• Education and training: 1) compilation and maintenance of an information clearinghouse, 2) development of educational programs for industry, and 3) support for industry-to-government and industry-to-industry training on food and agriculture issues.

The Role of the University of Minnesota

The topic of expertise and capabilities needed to deliver this set of highly specialized services recurred throughout the meeting. The Committee discussed the University of Minnesota as a potential source of independent, third party expertise for the resource center. The University's capabilities for this role are summarized as follows:

• Collaborators from the University offer the unique combination of core competence in key technical areas, professional credibility, security clearance needed to effectively address the full spectrum of food security issues, and experience working with the law enforcement and public health communities, including public communication in crisis situations. The areas of expertise include animal health, surveillance, infectious disease epidemiology, bioterrorism preparedness, prevention and treatment of foodborne illness, and food safety; in addition, the University of Minnesota collaborators have firsthand experience with agriculture and food industries, state health departments, the United States Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
• The University of Minnesota offers additional multidisciplinary expertise, given the presence of colleges of veterinary medicine, public health, medicine, and agriculture, all within the University of Minnesota system (one of only several U.S. universities with these comprehensive capabilities).
• CIDRAP's Web site www.cidrap.umn.edu already provides a state-of-the art model for Internet-based information on food and agriculture biosecurity, bioterrorism preparedness, and food safety.
• The Minnesota Data Practices Act, which governs collection and handling of data by public agencies (including the University of Minnesota), provides an additional measure of protection for sensitive information related to food biosecurity.

Outcome

The Committee met in a closed-door session with the University of Minnesota staff excused. They concluded it was important to continue efforts to develop the center, with industry working with the University collaborators, to define its scope, structure, cost, and objectives. There was universal agreement within the Committee that the University of Minnesota provides the best source of scientific and analytical expertise for this initiative, due to the capabilities outlined above.

Next Steps

The Committee decided that the next steps in the planning process include:

• Developing a "definition of scope" document, encompassing a phased plan of development over 24 months of a realistic set of high-priority features and services.
• Convening a second Planning Committee meeting in two months to discuss critical aspects of the center's operation, including: a legal framework for confidential information sharing and data privacy, coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement, funding, governance structure, membership criteria, and security clearance processes.

*CIDRAP's work in food system biosecurity is funded by a grant from NTI, a private charitable foundation based in Washington, DC.

The term "biosecurity" is used globally to encompass intentional threats, not only from biological agents but also from chemical and radiological agents. The scope may also include physical and cyber threats as applied to biosecurity.

Appendix A: Agriculture and Food Biosecurity Planning Committee Members

Dane Bernard, Chairman Vice President, Food Safety and Quality Assurance, Keystone Foods (West Conshohocken, PA)

Susan Ajeska Senior Vice President, Innovations and Quality Fresh Express (Salinas, CA) Wyatt Elder Manager, Corporate Food Safety Cargill, Inc. (Minneapolis, MN) Chet England, PhD Senior Director, Product Safety and Regulatory Affairs Burger King Corp. (Miami, FL) William G. Fry Vice President, Quality Assurance and Environmental Affairs H-E-B Grocery Co. (San Antonio, TX) Fred Hegele, PhD Senior Regulatory Officer General Mills, Inc. (Minneapolis, MN) Dave Hettinga Senior Vice President, Research & Development and Technical Land O'Lakes, Inc. (Arden Hills, MN) Stan Iwanicki Vice President, Science and Technology Birds Eye Foods, Inc. (San Antonio, TX) Joel Johnson CEO, President, and Chairman of the Board Hormel Foods (Austin, MN)

Beth Lautner, DVM, MS Vice President, Science and Technology National Pork Board (Des Moines, IA) Bill Lyons Vice President, Risk Management Sodexho, Inc. (Gaithersburg, MD) Jeff Sholl President The Sholl Group (Minnetonka, MN) David Theno, PhD Senior Vice President, Quality and Logistics Jack in the Box, Inc. (San Diego, CA) Ron Triani, PhD Director, Scientific Relations Kraft Foods, Inc. (Glenview, IL) Gary Weber, PhD Executive Director, Regulatory Affairs National Cattlemen's Beef Association (Washington, DC) Dave Wiemer Director, Quality Assurance Supervalu, Inc. (Minneapolis, MN) Fred Yoder President, National Corn Growers Association (Plain City, OH)

Appendix B: University of Minnesota Project Staff and Consultants

Laura Blaisdell Graduate Student Intern Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy Jill DeBoer, MPH Associate Director Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy Sue Ferenc, DVM, PhD Consultant, SAF?Risk, LC Dan Dennison, PhD Consultant Atlanta, GA Craig Hedberg, PhD Associate Professor Division of Environmental and Occupational Health School of Public Health

Will Hueston, DVM, MS, PhD Director, Center for Animal Health and Food Safety Professor, College of Veterinary Medicine and School of Public Health Kristine Moore, MD, MPH Medical Director Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy Michael Osterholm, PhD, MPH Director Center for Infectious Disease Research? and Policy Professor, School of Public Health Julie Ostrowsky, MSc Program Manager Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy

Appendix C: Other Participants

Forrest Dryden, PhD Vice President, Research & Development Hormel Foods (Austin, MN) Asha George, DrPH Senior Program Officer NTI (Washington, DC) Sue Harlander, PhD The Sholl Group (Minnetonka, MN)

Andy Jaine The Sholl Group (Minnetonka, MN) Brian Stevens Corporate Manager of Pork Procurement Hormel Foods (Austin, MN)